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ABSTRACT
Recently, α-Rank1, a graph-based algorithm, has been proposed as a solution to ranking joint policy profiles in large scale
multi-agent systems. α-Rank claimed tractability through a polynomial time implementation with respect to the total number
of pure strategy profiles. Here, we note that inputs to the algorithm were not clearly specified in the original presentation. As
such, we deem complexity claims as not grounded without a formal specification of the inputs. Using standard definitions from
complexity theory, we demonstrate exponential complexity in terms of the number of agents and conjecture solving α-Rank is,
in fact, NP-hard.
After thorough discussions with the authors, we were suggested that the input to α-Rank can be an exponentially-sized payoff
matrix; a claim promised to be clarified in subsequent manuscripts. Even though α-Rank exhibits a polynomial-time solution with
respect to such an input, we, further, reflect additional critical problems. We demonstrate that due to the need of constructing
an exponentially large Markov chain, α-Rank is infeasible beyond a small finite number of agents. We ground these claims by
adopting amount of dollars spent as a non-refutable evaluation metric. Precisely, we demonstrate that with a one trillion dollars
budget, α-Rank can only handle tens of agents. Realising such scalability issues, we present a stochastic implementation of
α-Rank with a double oracle mechanism allowing for reductions in joint strategy spaces. Our method, named by αα -Rank, does
not need to save exponentially-large transition matrices, and can terminate early by specifying a precision parameter. Although
theoretically our method exhibits similar worst-case complexity guarantees compared to the default implementation of α-Rank,
it allows us, for the first time, to practically conduct large-scale multi-agent evaluation experiments. Our results demonstrate
that on 104×104 randomly generated matrices, we achieve 1000x speed reduction compared to α-Rank. Furthermore, we also
show successful results on large joint strategy profiles with a maximum size in the order of O(225) (≈ 33 million joint strategies)
– a setting not evaluable using α-Rank with reasonable computational budget.
1 Introduction
Scalable policy evaluation and learning have been long-standing challenges in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL)
with two difficulties obstructing progress. First, joint-strategy spaces exponentially explode when a large number of strategic
decision-makers is considered, and second, the underlying game dynamics may exhibit cyclic behaviour (e.g. the game of
Rock-Paper-Scissor) rendering an appropriate evaluation criteria non-trivial. Focusing on the second challenge, much work
in multi-agent systems followed a game-theoretic treatment proposing fixed-points, e.g., Nash2 equilibrium, as potentially
valid evaluation metrics. Though appealing, such measures are normative only when prescribing behaviours of perfectly
rational agents – an assumption rarely met in reality3–6. In fact, many game dynamics have been proven not converge to any
fixed-point equilibria7, 8, but rather to limit cycles9, 10. Apart from these challenges, solving for a Nash equilibrium even for
“simple” settings, e.g. two-player games is known to be PPAD-complete11 – a demanding complexity class when it comes to
computational requirements.
To address some of the above limitations,1 recently proposed α-Rank as a graph-based game-theoretic solution to multi-
agent evaluation. α-Rank adopts Markov Conley Chains to highlight the presence of cycles in game dynamics, and attempts
to compute stationary distributions as a mean for strategy profile ranking. In a novel attempt, the authors reduce multi-agent
evaluation to computing a stationary distribution of a Markov chain. Namely, consider a set of N agents each having a strategy
pool of size k, a Markov chain is, first, defined over the graph of joint strategy profiles with a transition matrix T ∈RkN×kN , and
then a stationary distribution ν ∈ RkN is computed solving: T ν = ν . The probability mass in ν then represents the ranking of
joint-strategy profile.
Extensions of α-Rank have been developed on various instances.12 adapted α-Rank to model games with incomplete
information.13 combined α-Rank with the policy search space oracle (PSRO)14 and claimed their method to be a generalised
training approach for multi-agent learning. Unsurprisingly, these work inherit the same claim of tractability from α-Rank.
*First two authors contributed equally.
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Figure 1. Example of population based evaluation on N = 3 players (star, triangle, circle) each with |s|= 3 strategies (denoted
by the colours) and m = 5 copies. a) Each population obtains a fitness valuePi depending on the strategies chosen, b) one
mutation strategy (red star) occurs, and c) the population either selects the original strategy, or being fixated by the mutation
strategy.
For example, the abstract in13 reads “α-Rank, which is unique (thus faces no equilibrium selection issues, unlike Nash) and
tractable to compute in general-sum, many-player settings.”
In this work, we contribute to refine the claims made in α-Rank dependent on its input type. We thoroughly argue that
α-Rank exhibits a prohibitive computational and memory bottleneck that is hard to remedy even if pay-off matrices were
provided as inputs. We measure such a restriction using money spent as a non-refutable metric to assess α-Rank’s validity scale.
With this in mind, we then present a stochastic solver that we title αα -Rank as a scalable and memory efficient alternative. Our
method reduces memory constraints, and makes use of the oracle mechanism for reductions in joint strategy spaces. This, in
turn, allows us to run large-scale multi-player experiments, including evaluation on self-driving cars and Ising models where
the maximum size involves tens of millions of joint strategies.
2 A Review of α-Rank
In α-Rank, strategy profiles of N agents are evaluated through an evolutionary process of mutation and selection. Initially,
agent populations are constructed by creating multiple copies of each learner i ∈ {1, . . . ,N} assuming that all agents (in one
population) execute the same unified policy. With this, α-Rank then simulates a multi-agent game played by randomly sampled
learners from each population. Upon game termination, each participating agent receives a payoff to be used in policy mutation
and selection after its return to the population. Here, the agent is faced with a probabilistic choice between switching to the
mutation policy, continuing to follow its current policy, or randomly selecting a novel policy (other than the previous two) from
the pool. This process repeats with the goal of determining an evolutionary dominant profile that spreads across the population
of agents. Fig. 1 demonstrates a simple example of a three-player game, each playing three strategies.
Mathematical Formulation: To formalise α-Rank, we consider N agents each, denoted by i, having access to a set of
strategies of size ki. We refer to the strategy set for agent i by Si =
{
pii,1, . . . ,pii,ki
}
, ki = |Si|, with pii, j :X ×Ai → [0,1]
representing the jth allowed policy of the learner. X represents the set of states and Ai is the set of actions for agent i. A
joint strategy profile is a set of policies for all participating agents in the joint strategy set, i.e.,Sjoint =S1×S2×·· ·×SN :
pijoint =
{
pi1, j1 , ...,piN, jN
}
, with pii, ji ∈Si and ji ∈ {1, . . . ,ki}. We assume k = k1 = . . .= kN hereafter.
To evaluate performance, we assume each agent is additionally equipped with a payoff (reward) functionPi :Sjoint→ R+.
Crucially, the domain ofPi is the pool of joint strategies so as to accommodate the effect of other learners on the ith player’s
performance. Finally, given a joint profile pijoint, we define the corresponding joint payoff to be the collection of all individual
payoff functions, i.e.,Pjoint =
{
P1
(
pijoint
)
, . . . ,PN
(
pijoint
)}
. After attaining payoffs from the environment, each agent returns
to its population and faces a choice between switching the whole population to a mutation policy, exploring a novel policy, or
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Algorithm 1 α-Rank (see Section 3.1.1 in1)
1: (Unspecified) Inputs: Sjoint, Multi-agent Simulator
2: Listing all possible joint-strategy profiles, for each profile, run the multi-agent simulator to get the payoff values for all
playersPjoint =
{
P1
(
pijoint
)
, . . . ,PN
(
pijoint
)}
,∀pijoint ∈Sjoint.
3: Construct Markov chain’s transition matrix T by Eqn. 2.
4: Compute the stationary distribution v by Eqn. 3.
5: Rank all pijoint in v based on their probability masses.
6: Outputs: The ranked list of v (each element refers to the time that players spend in playing that pijoint during evolution).
sticking to the current one. Such a choice is probabilistic and defined proportional to rewards by
P(pii,a→ pii,b,pi−i) = e
αPi(pii,b,pi−i)
eαPi(pii,a,pi−i)+ eαPi(pii,b,pi−i)
− µ
2
, for
(
pii,a,pii,b
) ∈Si×Si,
P(pii,a→ pii,c,pi−i) = µKi−2 , ∀pii,c ∈Si \{pii,a,pii,b},
with µ ∈ R+ being an exploration parameter1, pi−i = pi \pii representing policies followed by other agents, and α ∈ R+ an
ranking-intensity parameter. Large α ensures that the probability that a sub-optimal strategy overtakes a better strategy is close
to zero.
As noted in1, one can relate the above switching process to a random walk on a Markov chain with states defined as
elements inSjoint. Essentially, the Markov chain models the sink strongly connected components (SSCC) of the response graph
associated with the game. The response graph of a game is a directed graph where each node corresponds to each joint strategy
profile, and directed edges if the deviating player’s new strategy is a better response to that player, and the SSCC of a directed
graph are the (group of) nodes with no out-going edges.
Each entry in the transition probability matrix T ∈ R
∣∣Sjoint∣∣×∣∣Sjoint∣∣ of Markov chain refers to the probability of one agent
switching from one policy in a relation to attained payoffs. Consider any two joint strategy profiles pijoint and pˆijoint that
differ in only one individual strategy for the ith agent, i.e., there exists an unique agent such that pi joint =
{
pii,a,pi−i
}
and
pˆijoint =
{
pˆi i,b,pi−i
}
with pii,a 6= pˆii,b, we set [T ]pi joint,pˆi joint = 1∑Nl=1(kl−1)ρpii,a,pˆii,b
(
pi−i
)
, with ρpii,a,pˆii,b
(
pi−i
)
defining the probability
that one copy of agent i with strategy pii,a invades the population with all other agents (in that population) playing pˆii,b.
Following16, forPi
(
pii,a,pi−i
) 6=Pi(pˆii,b,pi−i), such a probability is formalised as
ρpii,a,pˆii,b(pi−i) =
1− e−α(Pi(pii,a,pi−i)−Pi(pˆii,b,pi−i))
1− e−mα(Pi(pii,a,pi−i)−Pi(pˆii,b,pi−i))
, (1)
and 1m otherwise, with m being the size of the population. So far, we presented relevant derivations for the (pi joint, pˆi joint)
entry of the state transition matrix when exactly the ith agent differs in exactly one strategy. Having one policy change,
however, only represents a subset of allowed variations; two more cases need to be considered. Now we restrict our attention to
variations in joint policies involving more than two individual strategies, i.e.,
∣∣pi joint \ pˆi joint ≥ 2∣∣. Here, we set2 [T ]pi joint,pˆi joint = 0.
Consequently, the remaining event of self-transitions can be thus written as [T ]pi joint,pˆi joint = 1−∑pˆi [T ]pi joint,pˆi . Summarising the
above three cases, we can write the (pi joint, pˆi joint)’s entry of the Markov chain’s transition matrix as:
[T ]pi joint,pˆi joint =

1
∑Nl=1(kl−1)
ρpii,a,pˆii,b
(
pi−i
)
, if |pi joint \ pˆi joint|= 1,
1− ∑
pˆi 6=pi joint
[T ]pi joint,pˆi , if pi joint = pˆi joint,
0, if |pi joint \ pˆi joint| ≥ 2,
(2)
The goal in α-Rank is to establish an ordering in policy profiles dependent on evolutionary stability of each joint strategy. In
other words, higher ranked strategies are these that are prevalent in populations with higher average time of survival. Formally,
1Please note that in the original paper µ is heuristically set to a small positive constant to ensure at maximum two varying policies per-each population.
Theoretical justification can be found in 15.
2 This assumption significantly reduces the analysis complexity as detailed in15.
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such a notion can be easily derived as the limiting vector v = limt→∞
[
[T ]T
]t
v0 of our Markov chain when evolving from an
initial distribution v0. Knowing that the limiting vector is a stationary distribution, one can calculate in fact the solution to the
following eigenvector problem:
[T ]T v = v. (3)
We summarised the pseudo-code of α-Rank in Algorithm 1. As the input to α-Rank is unclear and turns out to be controversial
later, we point the readers to the original description in Section 3.1.1 of1, and the practical implementation of α-Rank from17
for self-judgement. In what comes next, we demonstrate that the tractability claim of α-Rank needs to be relaxed as the
algorithm exhibits exponential time and memory complexities in number of players dependent on the input type considered.
This, consequently, renders α-Rank inapplicable to large-scale multi-agent systems contrary to the original presentation.
3 Claims & Refinements
Original presentation of α-Rank claims to be tractable in the sense that it runs in polynomial time with respect to the total
number of joint-strategy profiles. Unfortunately, such a claim is not clear without a formal specification of the inputs to
Algorithm 3.1.1 in1. In fact, we, next, demonstrate that α-Rank’s can easily exhibit exponential complexity under the input
of N× k table, rendering it inapplicable beyond finite small number of players. We also present a conjecture stating that
determining the top-rank joint strategy profile in α-Rank is in fact NP-hard.
3.1 On α-Rank’s Computational Complexity
Before diving into the details of our arguments, it is first instructive to note that tractable algorithms are these that exhibit a
worst-case polynomial running time in the size of their input18. Mathematically, for a sizeI input, a polynomial time algorithm
adheres to an O(I d) complexity for some constant d independent of I .
Following the presentation in Section 3.1.1 in1, α-Rank assumes availability of a game simulator to construct a payoff
matrix quantifying performance of joint strategy profiles. As such, we deem that necessary inputs for such a construction is of
the size I = N× k, where N is the total number of agents and k is the total number of strategies per agent, where we assumed
k = ki = k j for simplicity.
Following the definition above, if α-Rank possesses polynomial complexity then it should attain a time proportional to
O
(
(N× k)d
)
with d being a constant independent of N and k. As the algorithm requires to compute a stationary distribution
of a Markov chain described by a transition matrix T with kN rows and columns, the time complexity of α-Rank amounts
to O
(
kN
)
. Clearly, this result demonstrates exponential, thus intractable, complexity in the number of agent N. In fact, we
conjecture that determining top rank joint strategy profile using α-Rank with an N× k input is NP-hard.
Conjecture: [α-Rank is NP-hard] Consider N agents each with k strategies. Computing top-rank joint strategy profile with
respect to the stationary distribution of the Markov chain’s transition matrix, T , is NP-hard.
Reasoning: To illustrate the point of the conjecture above, imagine N agents each with k strategies. Following the certificate
argument for determining complexity classes, we ask the question:
“Assume we are given a joint strategy profile pijoint, is pijoint top rank w.r.t the stationary distribution of the Markov chain?”
To determine an answer to the above question, one requires an evaluation mechanism of some sort. If the time complexity of
this mechanism is polynomial with respect to the input size, i.e., N× k, then one can claim that the problem belongs to the
NP complexity class. However, if the aforementioned mechanism exhibits an exponential time complexity, then the problem
belongs to NP-hard complexity class. When it comes to α-Rank, we believe a mechanism answering the above question
would require computing a holistic solution of the problem, which, unfortunately, is exponential (i.e., O(kN)). Crucially, if our
conjecture proves correct, we do not see how α-Rank can handle more than a finite small number of agents.
3.2 On Optimisation-Based Techniques
Given exponential complexity as derived above, we can resort to approximations of stationary distributions that aim at
determining ε-close solution for some precision parameter ε > 0. Here, we note that a problem of this type is a long-standing
classical problem from linear algebra. Various techniques including Power method, PageRank, eigenvalue decomposition, and
mirror descent can be utilised. Briefly surveying this literature, we demonstrate that any such implementation (unfortunately)
scales exponentially in the number of players. For a quick summary, please consult Table 1.
4/15
Table 1. Time and space complexity comparison given N(number of agents)× k(number of strategies) table as inputs.
Method Time Memory
Power Method O
(
kN+1N
)
O
(
kN+1N
)
PageRank O
(
kN+1N
)
O
(
kN+1N
)
Eig. Decomp. O
(
kNω
)
O
(
kN+1N
)
Mirror Descent O
(
kN+1 logk
)
O
(
kN+1N
)
Power Method.
One of the most common approaches to computing a stationary distribution is the power method that computes the stationary
vector v by constructing a sequence
{
v j
}
j≥0 from a non-zero initialisation v0 by applying v j+1 = 1/
∣∣∣∣T ,Tv j∣∣∣∣T Tv j. Though
viable, we first note that the power method exhibits an exponential memory complexity in terms of the number of agents. To
formally derive the bound, define n to represent the total number of joint strategy profiles, i.e., n = kN , and m the total number
of transitions between the states of the Markov chain. By construction, one can easily see that m = n
(
kN−N+1) as each row
and column in T contains kN−N+1 non-zero elements. Hence, memory complexity of such implementation is in the order of
O(m) = O
(
n
[
kN−N+1])≈O(kNkN).
The time complexity of a power method, furthermore, is given by O(m×T ), where T is the total number of iterations.
Since m is of the order n logn, the total complexity of such an implementation is also exponential.
PageRank.
Inspired by ranking web-pages on the internet, one can consider PageRank19 for computing the solution to the eigenvalue
problem presented above. Applied to our setting, we first realize that the memory is analogous to the power method that is3
O(m) = O
(
KN+1N
)
, and the time complexity are in the order of O(m+n)≈ O(KN+1N).
Eigenvalue Decomposition.
Apart from the above, we can also consider the problem as a standard eigenvalue decomposition task (also what is used to
implement α-Rank in17) and adopt the method in20 to compute the stationary distribution. Unfortunately, state-of-the-art
techniques for eigenvalue decomposition also require exponential memory (O
(
KN+1N
)
) and exhibit a time complexity of the
form O(nω) = O(kNω) with ω ∈ [2,2.376]20. Clearly, these bounds restrict α-Rank to small agent number N.
Mirror Descent.
Another optimisation-based alternative is the ordered subsets mirror descent algorithm21. This is an iterative procedure requiring
projection step on the standard n-dimensional simplex on every iteration: ∆n = {x ∈ Rn : xT1 = 1 & x  0}. As mentioned
in21, computing this projection requires O(n logn) time. Hence, the projection step is exponential in the number of agents N.
This makes mirror descent inapplicable to α-Rank when N is large.
Apart from the methods listed above, we are aware of other approaches that could solve the leading eigenvector for big
matrices, for example the online learning approach22, the sketching methods23, and the subspace iteration with Rayleigh-Ritz
acceleration24. The trade-off of these methods is that they usually assume special structure of the matrix, such as being
Hermitian or at least positive semi-definite, which α-Rank however does not fit. Importantly, they can not offer any advantages
on the time complexity either.
4 Reconsidering α-Rank’s Inputs
Having discussed our results with the authors, we were suggested that “inputs” to α-Rank are exponentially-sized payoff
matrices, i.e., assuming line 2 in Algorithm 1 as an input4. Though polynomial in an exponentially-sized input, this consideration
does not resolve problems mentioned above. In this section, we further demonstrate additional theoretical and practical problems
when considering the advised “input” by the authors.
3In some works, people typically equate the power method with PageRank algorithm.
4We were also promised such claims to be clarified in subsequent submissions.
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Figure 2. Money cost of constructing the transition matrix T in computing α-Rank (line 3 in Algorithm 1). Note that one
trillion dollar is the world’s total hardware budget. The projected contours shows that due to the exponentially-growing size of
α-Rank’s “input”, under reasonable budget, it is infeasible to handle multi-agent evaluations with more than ten agents.
4.1 On the Definition of Agents
α-Rank redefines a strategy to correspond to the agents under evaluation differentiating them from players in the game (see
line 4 in Section 3.1.1 and also Fig. 2a in1). Complexity results are then given in terms of these “agents”, where tractability is
claimed. We would like to clarify that such definitions do not necessarily reflect the true underlying time complexity, whereby
without formal input definitions, it is difficult to claim tractability.
To illustrate, consider solving a travelling salesman problem in which a traveller needs to visit a set of cities while returning
to the origin following the shortest route. Although it is well-known that the travelling salesman problem is NP-hard, following
the line of thought presented in α-Rank, one can show that such a problem reduces to a polynomial time (linear, i.e., tractable)
problem in the size of “meta-cities”, which is not a valid claim.
So what are the “meta-cities”, and what is wrong with the above argument?
A strategy in the travelling salesman problem corresponds to a permutation in the order of cities. Rather than operating with
number of cities, following α-Rank, we can construct the space of all permutation calling each a “meta-city” (or agent)5.
Having enumerated all permutations, somehow, searching for the shortest route can be performed in polynomial time. Even
though, one can state that solving the travelling salesman problem is polynomial in the size of permutations, it is incorrect to
claim that any such algorithm is tractable. The same exact argument can be made for α-Rank, whereby having a polynomial
time algorithm in an exponentially-sized space does not at all imply tractability6. It is for this reason, that reporting complexity
results needs to be done with respect to the size of the input without any redefinition (we believe these are agents in multi-agent
systems according to Section 3.1.1 in1, and cities in the travelling salesman problem).
As is clear so-far, inputs to α-Rank lack clarity. Confused on the form of the input, we realise that the we are left with
two choices: 1) list of all joint strategy profiles, or 2) a table of the size N× k – collection of all of the players’ strategy pools.
If we are to follow the first direction, the claims made in the paper are of course correct; however, this by no means resolves
the problem as it is not clear how one would construct such an input in a tractable manner. Precisely, given an N× k table
(collection of all of the players’ strategy pools) as input, constructing the aforementioned list requires exponential time (kN).
In other words, providing α-Rank with such a list only hides the exponential complexity burden in a pre-processing step.
Analogously, applying this idea to the travelling salesman problem described above would hide the exponential complexity
under a pre-processing step used to construct all possible permutations. Provided as inputs, the travelling salesman problem can
now be solved in linear time, i.e., transforming an intractable problem to a tractable one by a mere redefinition.
5How to enumerate all these permutations is an interesting question. Analogously, if N×k was not the input to α-Rank, enumerating an exponentially sized
matrix is also an interesting question.
6Note that this claim does not apply on the complexity of solving Nash equilibrium. For example, in solving zero-sum games, polynomial tractability is
never claimed on the number of players, whereas α-Rank claims tractable in the number of players.
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Table 2. Cost of getting the payoff tablePjoint (line 2 in Algorithm 1) for the experiments conducted in1. We list the numbers
by the cost of running one joint-strategy profile × the number of joint-strategy profiles considered. Detailed computation can
be found here.
Game Env. PetaFlop/s-days Cost ($) Time (days)
AlphaZero Go25 1,413×7 207M 1.9M
AlphaGo Zero26 1,181×7 172M 1.6M
AlphaZero Chess25 17×1 352K 3.2K
MuJoCo Soccer27 0.053×10 4.1K 72
Leduc Poker14 0.006×9 420 7
Kuhn Poker28 < 10−4×256 < 1 −
AlphaStar29 52,425 244M 1.3M
4.2 Dollars Spent: A Non-Refutable Metric
Admittedly, our arguments have been mostly theoretical and can become controversial dependent on the setting one considers.
To abolish any doubts, we followed the advice given by the authors and considered the input of α-Rank to be exponentially-sized
payoff matrices. We then conducted an experiment measuring dollars spent to evaluate scalability of running just line 3 in
Algorithm 1, while considering the tasks reported in1.
Assuming Pjoint =
{
P1
(
pijoint
)
, . . . ,PN
(
pijoint
)}
,∀pijoint ∈Sjoint is given at no cost, the total amount of floating point
operations (FLOPS) needed for constructing T given in Eqn. 2 is 9kNN(k−1)+ kNN(k−1)+0 = 10kNN(k−1). In terms of
money cost needed for just building T , we plot the dollar amount in Fig. 2 considering the Nvidia Tesla K80 GPU7 which can
process under single precision at maximum 5.6 TFlop/s at a price of 0.9 $/hour8. Clearly, Fig. 2 shows that due to the fact that
α-Rank needs to construct a Markov chain with an exponential size in the number of agents, it is only “money” feasible on
tasks with at most tens of agents. It is also worth noting that our analysis is optimistic in the sense that we have not considered
costs of storing T nor computing stationary distributions.
Conclusion I: Given exponentially-sized payoff matrices, constructing transition matrices in α-Rank for about 20 agents each
with 8 strategies requires about one trillion dollars in budget.
Though assumed given, in reality, the payoff values Pjoint come at a non-trivial cost themselves, which is particularly
true in reinforcement learning tasks26. Here, we take a closer look at the amount of money it takes to attain payoff matrices
for the experiments listed in1 that we present in Table 2. Following the methodology in here, we first count the total FLOPS
each model uses under the unit of PetaFlop/s-day that consists of performing 1020 operations per second in one day. For each
experiment, if the answer to “how many GPUs were trained and for how long” was not available, we then traced back to the
neural architecture used and counted the operations needed for both forward and backward propagation. The cost in time was
then transformed from PetaFlop/s-day using Tesla K80 as discussed above. In addition, we also list the cost of attaining payoff
values from the most recent AlphaStar model29. It is obvious that although α-Rank could take the payoff values as “input” at a
hefty price, the cost of acquiring such values is not negligible, e.g., payoff values from GO cost about 207M $, and require a
single GPU to run for more than five thousand years9!
Conclusion II: Acquiring necessary inputs to α-Rank easily becomes intractable giving credence to our arguments in
Section 4.1.
5 A Practical Solution to α-Rank
One can consider approximate solutions to the problem in Eqn. 3. As briefly surveyed in Section 3, most current methods,
unfortunately, require exponential time and memory complexities. We believe achieving a solution that aims at reducing time
complexity is an interesting and open question in linear algebra in general, and leave such a study to future work. Here, we rather
contribute by a stochastic optimisation method that can attain a solution through random sampling of payoff matrices without
7https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nvidia_Tesla
8https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/instance-types/p2/
9 It is worth mentioning that here we only count running experiment once for getting each payoff value. In practice, the exact payoff values are hard to know
since the game outcomes are noisy; therefore, multiple samples are often needed (check Theorem 3.2 in12), which will turn the numbers in Table 2 to an even
larger scale.
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Algorithm 2 αα -Oracle: Practical Multi-Agent Evaluation
1: Inputs: Number of trailsN , total number of iterations T , decaying learning rate {ηt}Tt=1, penalty parameter λ , λ decay
rate γ > 1, and a constraint relaxation term δ , initialise p = 0.
2: while p≤N do:
3: Set the counter of running oracles, k = 0
4: Initialise the strategy set {S [0]i } by sub-sampling from {Si}
5: while {S [k]i } 6= {S [k−1]i } AND k ≥ 1 do:
6: Compute total number of joint profiles n =∏Ni=1 |S [k]i |
7: Initial a vector x0 = 1/n1
8: for t = 0→ T −1 do: // αα -Rank update
9: Uniformly sample one strategy profile i[k]t ∼ {1, . . . ,n}
10: Construct b[k]it as the i
[k]
t row of T
[k],T − I
11: Update x[k]t+1 = x
[k]
t −ηt∇x fi[k]t (x
[k]
t ) by Eqn. 7
12: Set λt+1 = λt/γ
13: Get pi [p],topjoint by ranking the prob. mass of v
[k] =
x[k]T
||x[k]T ||1
14: Set k = k+1
15: for each agent i do: // The oracles (Section 5.1)
16: Compute the best response pi∗i to pi
[p],top
joint by Eqn. 8
17: Update the strategy set byS [k]i =S
[k−1]
i ∪pi?i
18: Set p = p+1
19: Return: The best performing joint-strategy profile pi joint,? among {pi [1:N ],topjoint }.
the need to store exponential-size input. Contrary to memory requirements reported in Table 1, our method requires a linear
(in number of agents) per-iteration complexity of the form O(Nk). It is worth noting that most other techniques need to store
exponentially-sized matrices before commencing with any numerical instructions. Though we do not theoretically contribute to
reductions in time complexities, we do, however, augment our algorithm with a double-oracle heuristic for joint strategy space
reduction. In fact, our experiments reveal that αα -Rank can converge to the correct top-rank strategies in hundreds of iterations
in large strategy spaces, i.e., spaces with ≈ 33 million profiles.
Optimisation Problem Formulation: Computing the stationary distribution can be rewritten as an optimisation problem:
min
x
1
n
∣∣∣∣T T x− x∣∣∣∣22 s.t. xT 1 = 1, and x  0, (4)
where the constrained objective in Eqn. 4 simply seeks a vector x minimising the distance between x, itself, and T T x while
ensuring that x lies on an n-dimensional. To handle exponential complexities needed for acquiring exact solutions, we pose a
relaxation the problem in Eqn. 4 and focus on computing an approximate solution vector x˜ instead, where x˜ solves:
min
x
1
n
∣∣∣∣T T x− x∣∣∣∣22 s.t. ∣∣xT 1−1∣∣≤ δ for 0 < δ < 1, and x  0. (5)
Before proceeding, however, it is worth investigating the relation between the solutions of the original (Eqn. 4) and relaxed (Eqn.
5) problems. We summarise such a relation in the following proposition that shows that determining x˜ suffices for computing a
stationary distribution of α-Rank’s Markov chain:
Proposition: [Connections to Markov Chain] Let x˜ be a solution to the relaxed optimisation problem in Eqn. 5. Then, x˜/||x˜||1 = v
is the stationary distribution of Eqn. 3 in Section 2.
Importantly, the above proposition, additionally, allows us to focus on solving the problem in Eqn. 5 that only exhibits
inequality constraints. Problems of this nature can be solved by considering a barrier function leading to an unconstrained finite
sum minimisation problem. By denoting bi to be the i
th row of T T − I , we can, thus, write: 1n
∣∣∣∣T T x− x∣∣∣∣22 = 1n ∑ni=1 (xT bi)2 .
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Figure 3. Ranking intensity sweep on (a) Battle of Sexes (b) Biased RPS (c) Prisoner’s Dilemma.
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Figure 4. Comparisons of time and memory complexities on varying sizes of random matrices.
Introducing logarithmic barrier-functions, with λ > 0 being a penalty parameter, we have:
min
x∈Rn
1
n
n
∑
i=1
(
xT bi
)2−λ log(δ 2− [xT 1−1]2)− λ
n
n
∑
i=1
log(xi). (6)
Eqn. 6 represents a standard finite minimisation problem, which can be solved using any off-the-shelf stochastic optimisation
methods, e.g., stochastic gradients, ADAM30. A stochastic gradient execution involves sampling a strategy profile it ∼ [1, . . . ,n]
at iteration t, and then executing a descent step: xt+1 = xt −ηt∇x fit (xt), with ∇x fit (xt) being a sub-sampled gradient of Eqn. 6,
and λ being a scheduled penalty parameter with λt+1 = λt/γ for some γ > 1:
∇x fit (xt) = 2
(
bTit 1
)
bit +
2λt
(
xTt 1−1
)
δ 2− (xTt 1−1)2 − λt/n
[
1
[xt ]1
, . . . ,
1
[xt ]n
]T
. (7)
To avoid any confusion, we name the above stochastic approach of solving α-Rank via Eqn. 6 & 7 as αα -Rank and present
its pseudo-code in Algorithm 2. When comparing our algorithm to these reported in Table 1, it is worth highlighting that
computing updates using Eqn. 7 requires no storage of the full transition or payoff matrices as updates are performed only
using sub-sampled columns as shown in line 11 in Algorithm 2.
5.1 αα -Rank with Efficient Exploration & Oracles
Stochastic sampling enables to solve α-Rank with no need to store the transition matrix T ; however, the size of the column
bi (i.e., ∏Ni=1 ki) can still be prohibitively large. Here we further boost scalability of our method by introducing an oracle
mechanism. The heuristic of oracles was first proposed in solving large-scale zero-sum matrix games31. The idea is to first
create a sub-game in which all players are only allowed to play a restricted number of strategies, which are then expanded by
adding each of the players’ best-responses to their opponents; the sub-game will be replayed with agents’ augmented strategy
sets before a new round of best responses is computed.
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Figure 5. Large-scale multi-agent evaluations. (a) Convergence of the optimal joint-strategy profile in self-driving simulation.
(b) Status of the Ising-model equilibrium measured by ξ = |N↑−N↓||N| . (c) Change of the top-rank profile from α
α -Oracle under
τ = 1,α = 1.
The best response is assumed to be given by an oracle that can be simply implemented by a grid search, where given the
top-rank profile pi top−i at iteration k, the goal for agent i is to select the optimal pi
∗
i from a pre-defined strategy setSi to maximise
its reward:
pi?i = arg maxpii∈Si
Epii,pi top−i
[
∑
h≥0
γhi Pi(xh,ui,h,u−i,h)
]
, (8)
with xh denoting the state, ui,h∼ pii(·|xi,h), u−i,h∼ pi top−i (·|x−i,h) denoting the actions from agent i and the opponents, respectively.
Though worse-case scenario of introducing oracles would require solving the original evaluation problem, our experimental
results on large-scale systems demonstrate efficiency by converging early.
For a complete exposition, we summarise the pseudo-code of our proposed method, named as αα -Oracle, in Algorithm 1.
αα -Oracle degenerates to αα -Rank (lines 6−13) if one initialises strategy sets of agents by the full size at the beginning, i.e.,
{S [0]i }, {Si}.
Providing valid convergence guarantee for αα -Oracle is an interesting direction for future work. In fact, recently13 proposed
a close idea of adopting an oracle mechanism into α-Rank without any stochastic solver however. Interestingly, it is reported
that bad initialisation can lead to failures in recovering top-rank strategies. Contrary to the results reported in13, we rather
demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach through running multiple trails of initialisation for {S [0]i }. In addition, we also
believe the stochastic nature of αα -Oracle potentially prevents from being trapped by the local minimal from sub-games.
6 Experiments
In this section, we demonstrate the scalability of αα -Rank in successfully recovering optimal policies in self-driving car
simulations and in the Ising model–a setting with tens-of-millions of possible strategies. We note that these sizes are far beyond
the capability of state-of-the-art methods; α-Rank1 considers at maximum 4 agents with 4 strategies. All of our experiments
were run only on a single machine with 64 GB memory and 10-core Intel i9 CPU.
Sparsity Data Structure: During the implementation phase, we realised that the transition probability, T [k], of the Markov
chain induces a sparsity pattern (each row and column in T [k] contains ∑Ni=1 k
[k]
i −N+1 non-zero elements, check Section 5)
that if exploited can lead to significant speed-up. To fully leverage such sparsity, we tailored a novel data structure for sparse
storage and computations needed by Algorithm 2. More details are in Appendix 1.1.
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Correctness of Ranking Results: As Algorithm 2 is a generalisation (in terms of scalability) of α-Rank, it is instructive to
validate the correctness of our results on three simple matrix games. Due to space constraints, we refrain the full description
of these tasks to Appendix 1.2. Fig. 3, however, shows that, in fact, results generated by αα -Rank are consistent with these
reported in1.
Complexity Comparisons on Random Matrices: To further assess scalability, we measured the time and memory needed by
our method for computing stationary distributions of varying sizes of simulated random matrices. Baselines included eigenvalue
decomposition from Numpy, optimisation tools from PyTorch, and α-Rank from OpenSpiel17. We terminated execution of
αα -Rank when gradient norms fell-short a predefined threshold of 0.01. According to Fig. 4, αα -Rank can achieve three orders
of magnitude reduction in time (i.e. 1000x faster) compared to default α-Rank implementation from17. Memory-wise, our
method uses only half of the space when considering, for instance, matrices of the size 104×104.
Autonomous Driving on Highway: Having assessed correctness and scalability, we now present novel application domains
on large-scale multi-agent/multi-player systems. For that we made used of high-way32; an environment for simulating self-
driving scenarios with social vehicles designed to mimic real-world traffic flow. We conducted a ranking experiment involving 5
agents each with 5 strategies, i.e., a strategy space in the order of O(55) (3125 possible strategy profiles). Agent strategies varied
between “rational” and “dangerous” drivers, which we encoded using different reward functions during training (complete
details of reward functions are in Appendix 2.2). Under this setting, we knew, upfront, that optimal profile corresponds to all
agents being five rational drivers. Cars trained using value iteration and the rewards averaged from 200 test trails were reported.
We considered both αα -Rank and αα -Oracle, and reported the results by running 1000 random seeds. We set αα -Oracle to
run 200 iterations of gradient updates in solving the top-rank strategy profile (lines 8−12 in Algorithm 2). Results depicted in
Fig. 5(a) clearly demonstrate that both our proposed methods are capable of recovering the correct highest ranking strategy
profile. αα -Oracle converges faster than αα -Rank, which we believe is due to the oracle mechanism saving time in inefficiently
exploring “dangerous” drivers upon one observation. We also note that although such size of problem are feasible using α-Rank
and the Power Method, our results achieve 4 orders of reduction in number of iterations.
Ising Model Experiment: We repeated the above experiment on the Ising model33 that is typically used for describing
ferromagnetism in statistical mechanics. It assumes a system of magnetic spins, where each spin a j is either an up-spin, ↑, or
down-spin, ↓. The system energy is defined by E(a,h) =−∑ j(h ja j + λ2 ∑k 6= j a jak) with h j and λ being constant coefficients.
The probability of one spin configuration is P(a) = exp(−E(a,h)/τ)∑a exp(−E(a,h)/τ) where τ is the environmental temperature. Finding the
equilibrium of the system is notoriously hard because it is needed to enumerate all possible configurations in computing P(a).
Traditional approaches include Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). An interesting phenomenon is the phase change, i.e., the
spins will reach an equilibrium in the low temperatures, with the increasing τ , such equilibrium will suddenly break and the
system becomes chaotic.
Here we try to observe the phase change through multi-agent evaluation methods. We assume each spins as an agent, and
the reward to be r j = h ja j + λ2 ∑k 6= j a
jak. We consider the top-rank strategy profile from αα -Oracle as the system equilibrium
and compare it against the ground truth from MCMC. We consider a 5× 5 2D model which induces a prohibitively-large
strategy space of the size 225 (≈ 33 million strategies) to which existing methods are inapplicable. Fig. 5(b) illustrates that our
method identifies the same phase change as that of MCMC. We also show an example of how αα -Oracle’s top-ranked profile
finds the system’s equilibrium when τ = 1 in Fig. 5(c). Note that the problem of 25 agent with 2 strategies goes far beyond the
capability of α-Rank on one single machine (billions of elements in T ); we therefore don’t list its performance here.
7 Conclusions & Future Work
In this paper, we presented major bottlenecks prohibiting α-Rank from scaling beyond tens of agents. Dependent on the type
of input, α-Rank’s time and memory complexities can easily become exponential. We further argued that notions introduced
in α-Rank can lead to confusing tractability results on notoriously difficult NP-hard problems. To eradicate any doubts, we
empirically validated our claims by presenting dollars spent as a non-refutable metric.
Realising these problems, we proposed a scalable alternative for multi-agent evaluation based on stochastic optimisation
and double oracles, along with rigorous scalability results on a variety of benchmarks. For future work, we plan to understand
the relation between α-Rank’s solution and that of a Nash equilibrium. Second, we will attempt to conduct a theoretical study
on the convergence of our proposed αα -Oracle algorithm.
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Appendix
1 Implementation of αα -RANK
Table 3. Hyper-parameter settings for the experiments
Experiments m α η Max. Iteration β 1 λ δ
NFG (without self-play) 50 10−4 ∼ 102 1.0 1000 0.9 0.5 0.1
NFG (self-play) 50 10−4 ∼ 102 0.03 1000 0.9 0.5 0.1
Random Matrix n/a n/a 0.01 1000 n/a 0.1 0.01
Car Experiment (SGD) 40 1.0 15.0 2000 0.999 0.5 0.1
Car Experiment (Oracle) 40 1.0 1.0 200 0.999 0.5 0.1
Ising Model 40 90.0 0.01 4000 0.999 0.5 0.1
1.1 The Data Structure for Sparsity
The transitional probability matrix T in αα -Rank is sparse; each row and column in T contains ∑Ni=1 ki−N + 1 non-zero
elements (see Section 5). To fully leverage such sparsity, we design a new data structure (see Fig. 6) for the storage and
computation. Compared to standard techniques (e.g., COO, CSR, and CRS10) that store (row, column, value) of a sparse
vector, our data structure adopts a more efficient protocol that stores (defaults, positions, biases) leading to improvements in
computational efficiency, which gives us additional advantages in computational efficiency. We reload the operations for such
data structure including addition, scalar multiplication, dot product, element-wise square root, L1 norm. We show the example
of addition in Fig. 6.
1.2 Validity Check on Normal-form Games
Our algorithm provides the expected ranking in all three normal-form games shown in Fig. 3, which is consistent with the
results in α-Rank1.
Battle of sexes. Battle of sexes is an asymmetric game ROM = [ 3,2 0,00,0 2,3 ]. αα -Rank suggests that populations would spend
an equal amount of time on the profile (O,O) and (M,M) during the evolution. The distribution mass of (M,O) drops to 0 faster
than that of (O,M), this is because deviating from (M,O) for either player has a larger gain (from 0 to 3) than deviating from
(O,M) (from 0 to 2).
Biased Rock-Paper-Scissor. We consider the biased RPS game RRPS =
[
0 −0.5 1
0.5 0 −0.1
−1 0.1 0
]
. As it is a single-population
game, we adopt the transitional probability matrix of Eqn. 11 in1. Such game has the inherent structure that Rock/Paper/Scissor
is equally likely to be invaded by a mutant, e.g., the scissor population will always be fixated by the rock population, therefore,
our method suggests the long-term survival rate for all three strategies are the same ( 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ). Note this is different from the
Nash equilibrium solution that is ( 116 ,
5
8 ,
5
16 ).
Prison’s Dilemma. In prison’s dilemma RCD = [ −1,−1 −3,00,−3 −2,−2 ], cooperation is an evolutionary transient strategy since the
cooperation player can always be exploited by the defection player. Our method thus yields (D,D) as the only strategy profile
that could survive in the long-term evolution.
2 Additional Details for Experiments
2.1 Hyper-parameters Settings
For all of our experiments, the gradient updates include two phases: warm-up phase and Adam30 phase. In the warm-up phase,
we used standard stochastic gradient descent; after that, we replace SGD with Adam till the convergence. In practice, we
find this yields faster convergence than normal stochastic gradient descent. As our algorithm does column sampling for the
stochastic matrix (i.e. batch size equals to one), adding momentum term intuitively help stabilise the learning. The warm-up
step is 100 for all experiments
We also implement infinite α17, when calculating transition matrix (or its column), where our noise term is set to be 0.01.
10https://docs.scipy.org/doc/scipy/reference/sparse.html
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Sparse Vector Representation
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Figure 6. Sparse vector representation in αα -Rank.
For most of our experiments that involve αα -rank, we set the terminating condition to be, when the gradient norm is less
than 10−9. However, for Random Matrix experiment, we set the terminating gradient norm to be 10−2
• Learning rate to be in between 15 - 17
• Alpha (ranking intensity) to be in between 1 - 2.5
• Number of Population to be between 25 - 55 (in integer)
For all of the Adam experiments, after the warmup-step we chooses to decay δ and λ by 0.999 for each time steps, where we
have δ to always be 0.1. Similarly, λ starts at the value 0.5. However, in speed and memory experiment, we chooses the decay
to be 0.9
List of symbols and names
• Population size: m
• Ranking Intensity: α
• Learning rate: η
2.2 Self-driving Car Experiment
Table 4. Reward settings in Self-driving Car Simulation.
Collision Reward Speed Reward
Rational driver -2.0 0.4
Dangerous driver 1 10.0 10.0
Dangerous driver 2 20.0 10.0
Dangerous driver 3 30.0 10.0
Dangerous driver 4 40.0 10.0
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The environmental reward given to each agent is calculated by
Collision Reward+
Current Velocity
Default Velocity
×Proportional Speed Reward
Collision Reward is calculated when agent collided with either social car or other agents. All of our value iteration agents
are based on32 environment discretisation, which represents the environment in terms of time to collision MDP, taking into
account that the other agents are moving in constant speed. For all experiments, we run value-iteration for 200 steps with
the discounting factor of 0.99. For each controllable cars, the default speed is randomised to be between 10 to 25, while the
social cars, the speed are randomised to be between 23 to 25. We define five types of driving behaviours (one rational + four
dangerous) by letting each controlled car have a different ego reward function during training (though the reward we report
is the environmental reward which cannot be changed). By setting this, we can make sure, at upfront, the best joint-strategy
strategy should be all cars to drive rationally.
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